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Mobilizing Diasporas: Insights from Turkey’s Attempts to Reach Turkish Citizens 
Abroad 
Dr. Zeynep Sahin Mencutek, Independent Researcher 
Dr. Bahar Baser1, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University, 
Innovation Village 5, Cheetah Road, CV1 2TL, Coventry, United Kingdom 
ABSTRACT 
Expansion in state-diaspora relations in recent decades has led to academic research 
questioning when, why and how sending states develop diaspora policies in order to re-
connect with their citizens abroad. Turkey, which has one of the highest rates of emigration in 
the world, is a particularly important case study in terms of illustrating a turn in the way it 
perceives its citizens abroad as a diaspora. When the AKP (Justice and Development Party) 
came to power, it attempted to develop a number of diaspora policies to maintain, cultivate 
and deepen relations with its emigrants with an aim of creating a mobilized transnational 
community. This article explains the transformation in this newly emerging engagement 
policy by putting an emphasis on Turkey’s foreign policy aspirations and the diffusion of 
Turkey’s domestic policies abroad.   
Key Words: diaspora, diaspora policy, emigrant states, foreign policy, Turkey. 
Introduction 
Over the past few decades, sending states have developed various strategies and practices for 
consciously and proactively engaging with their emigrant communities in order to maintain 
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ties and develop diaspora policies. There has been a growing interest in emigrants in 
discourses, and the introduction of a wide range of related policies and institutions. Although 
the disagreement exists regarding the precise meaning of the concept of diaspora in the 
general literature, some sociologists and political scientists studying sending state relations 
with emigrants have started to use the concepts of diaspora or diasporic policies.1 In a broad 
sense, diaspora policies refer to an entire range of policies, programs and institutions 
developed by sending states regarding emigrant affairs, particularly those aiming to produce 
legal, socio-cultural, economic, and political links.   
This expansion in states’ diaspora engagement attempts has led to academic research 
questioning when, why and how sending states develop diaspora policies and the conditions 
under which they experience an interest in engaging with their diaspora. Studies demonstrate 
that, firstly, sending states’ driving motives range from securing the flow of remittances to 
directing economic investments, meeting the needs and demands of emigrants, and forging 
loyalty and attachment among dispersed populations.2 Secondly, the literature has begun to 
analyse how diaspora policies are influenced by the characteristics of bilateral relationships 
between sending and receiving states, by state membership of regional or international 
organizations as well as the diffisuion of international norms.3 Existing literature has recently 
started to unravel (1) the centrality of diaspora policies for the state’s national and 
international agenda and, (2) how the possibility of enacting these policies is linked to the 
state’s international position. Overall, however, the links between diaspora policies and the 
state’s international standing (either real or prospective) remains under-theorised and under-
researched. The underestimation of foreign policy goals and the reflection of domestic politics 
with regards to diaspora formation can be explained by the fact that formal state policies 
towards diasporas fall into the grey area between Comparative Politics and International 
3 
 
Relations they have therefore been relatively overlooked by both fields.4 It has to be 
acknowledged that we need a more comprehensive framework that captures both domestic 
dynamics and international relations concerns of the sending state before we analyse its 
diaspora formation policies.5 
This article aims to fill a gap in exploring diaspora policies from the international 
politics perspective, suggesting that the international standing and foreign policy goals of 
sending states should be included within the explanatory frameworks because it may be 
central for understanding policy changes and their framing in certain countries. Also, 
explanations related to lobbying in the extant literature can be further elaborated by referring 
to the broader foreign policy context. Relying on Liza Mügge6 we also consider that 
ideologies of nationhood that the sending-state bears- as opposed to solely focusing on the 
sending-state capacity- economic benefits or the perks of globalization could be useful to 
capture the full picture. Therefore, we draw on previous literature that has dealt with the 
homeland-diaspora nexus and we adopt these conceptual frameworks and use them to 
systematically present the longitudinal changes in Turkish diaspora policy. Then, drawing on 
theoretical and comparative literature, we move on to analyze possible explanations for these 
changes.  
Why Study Turkey as a Sending State? 
The case of Turkey is particularly important in terms of analysing home states’ sudden 
interest in mobilizing their diaspora and exploring factors influencing their diaspora policies. 
Turkey is among the top ten emigration countries in the world with more than five million 
citizens living abroad and almost four million concentrated in Western European countries, 
constituting between 5-7 percent of the homeland population.7 This emigration largely began 
with the arrival of nearly 800,000 labourers in Germany, the Netherlands and France between 
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1961 and 1974. However, this is not Turkey’s first participation in international migration 
movements.8 
Migration from Turkey is highly internally diversified. Since the late 1970s, 
traditionally regulated labour migration has intertwined with illegal entries and overstays, as 
well as with family reunification. From the 1980s and 1990s growing numbers of refugees 
and asylum seekers, particularly Kurds, have considerably increased the number of migrants 
from Turkey. Against this background, Turkey has historically shown a limited and selective 
engagement with emigrants. They were not prioritized in the national agenda, and there were 
relatively few institutional arrangements. Most of Turkey’s political engagement in diaspora 
politics was about hindering the activism of the opposition groups outside its borders rather 
than creating a diaspora that it deemed to be ‘acceptable’ to the ideologies of the state and that 
is fully embedded in its own understanding of citizenship and nation.9 However, the 2000s 
marked a turning point in terms of Turkey’s growing interest towards emigrants and their 
organizations as it started actively implementing a consistent policy on engaging with its 
diaspora. Important transformations in diaspora policies have been observed in many areas, 
ranging from granting political rights, to socio-economic provisions and new institutional 
engagements. A series of legislative initiatives have been launched. The Turkish state also 
understood that diaspora formation could not be achieved by solely making institutional 
changes. Based on this, one can also observe a dense and increasing relationship between 
diaspora/civil society organizations and state actors.  
For instance, emigrants, particularly Turks residing in Western Europe, have been 
approached and presented as ‘ambassadors of Turkey’ and catalysts in the EU accession 
process, up until around 2007.  Second, especially in later years and in the context of growing 
foreign policy assertiveness, the government has promoted diaspora policies aimed at 
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enhancing Turkey's image as a regional and, potentially, global power. As a part of this, the 
government has identified (with questionable results) a potential role for emigrants and their 
organizations in lobbying for public diplomacy and for increasing Turkey’s soft power. It 
should also be considered that the state approached certain segments of migrants from 
Turkey, for instance it almost completely sidelined the Kurds, Alevites or non-Muslims such 
as the Assyrians. In this way, diaspora formation policies projected the state’s internal 
understanding of ‘acceptable citizens’ to its citizens abroad. Although, it is too early to fully 
analyse the impact of these recent changes, this article nonetheless aims to reveal the driving 
factors behind these new developments and how they are perceived by various actors in the 
transnational field.  
Before moving to the discussion, a note on data collection is necessary. Data for this 
study was gathered using documentary sources; newspaper and online reporting; published 
reports; scholarly work and ethnography. The first author conducted interviews with three 
public officers who work for a new state agency dealing with diaspora policies: the 
Presidency of Turks Abroad and Kin Communities (PTAKC). The research extended to 
Germany, which hosts the highest number of Turkish emigrants and is the main target for 
Turkey’s diaspora policies.  In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with two 
Turkish consulate generals, five Turkish association leaders, two journalists, two politicians in 
German parties, two scholars, and a number of activists to gauge their understanding of 
diaspora policies and to document actual policy implementation, improvements and 
shortcomings in the summer of 2014. The author also administered a pilot survey in the 
United Kingdom. Survey sample size is 252 including polling station surveys that were 
conducted with Turkish voters face-to-face on August the 2nd and the 3rd 2014 at the 
Kensington Olympia. Post election surveys were also conducted with journalists, 
representatives of emigrant associations and of parties in the UK via telephone and email in 
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the two weeks following the elections.10 The second author conducted over a hundred 
interviews with members of the Turkish and Kurdish diasporas, particularly with the leaders 
of migrant associations since 2008 in various European countries. These were conducted in 
order to examine the factors that have an impact on diaspora mobilization among these 
groups.  The sample included both diaspora elite and constituents from Turkish and Kurdish 
associations in these countries. The arguments in this paper will reflect both authors’ 
fieldwork observations.  
Conceptualizing Diaspora Policies and Scrutinizing the Homestate’s Reach to Its 
Diaspora 
Diasporas have become one of the hottest topics for academic and political discussion over the 
last few decades. Once considered as victims or groups who cannot be integrated, nowadays 
they are referred to as one of the most prominent non-state actors that affect policy-making 
both in home and host countries. This is because most diaspora groups have started acting 
similarly to other interest or lobby groups and civil society organisations. 11Some studies depict 
diasporas as (1) ambigious actors who support armed groups in their homelands and (2) as 
transnational actors who sustain terrorist networks globally.12 Others depict diasporas as 
peacemakers in conflict situations. Consequently, diasporas are said to have an impact on either 
the prolongation or the ending of homeland conflicts. They are said to contribute to 
development projects in post-war societies and peacebuilding mechanisms in their 
homelands.13 
  There is a triadic relationship among diasporas, the territorial states and contexts where 
such groups reside, and the homeland states and the contexts where they or their forbears come 
from. Diaspora theory has been structured around the multi-faceted relationships between these 
three actors. Diaspora, by definition, takes its raison d’être from a sense of belonging to the 
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homeland. As the homeland becomes the main core that holds a community with a self-
ascribed identity together, it becomes the target of this community’s attention and future 
projects. They influence their homeland’s policies through their support of or opposition to 
governments, and provide financial and other support to political parties, social movements, 
and civil society organisations.14 There is also an asymmetrical relationship between the 
homeland and the diaspora, meaning that one is more dominant than the other depending on the 
political, economic and social situations in the home country. The strength of relations between 
the homeland and the diaspora is one of the main determinants of diaspora (or diasporic) 
mobilization. This mobilization refers to a diaspora’s engagement with homeland politics from 
afar while at the same time engaging with hostland actors to pursue a certain agenda in relation 
to their homeland. On the other hand, homelands also may perceive an interest in maintaining 
ties with diasporas and may act in favour of the creation of a diaspora abroad by launching 
pertinent diaspora policies and establishing institutions. The emergence of diaspora 
mobilization is a preferred strategy of both state elites and non-state political entrepreneurs. 15 
Thus, ‘importing the concept of diaspora into International Relations discipline is a useful way 
of analysing these processes, since it provides a means of examining how identity constructs 
can be deployed to sustain collective identities across territorial borders’.16 
  Recently, extensive academic studies have sought to compare and theorize diaspora 
policies by focusing on home state positions and the rationale of their policies.17 Traditional 
approaches that emphasize economic causes, argue that remittances and development are often 
the main intended goal of state’s diaspora policies because undeveloped sending states need 
migrant remittances or need a safety valve for unemployment.18 Developing countries seek to 
benefit from foreign direct investment, emigrants’ presence in multinational corporations or 
international lending agencies as well as brain gain and circulation. In these case, the homeland 
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goes along with diaspora policies because the homeland is in a weaker position and depends 
upon diaspora funds, investments and remittances for its development. The impact of the 
Armenian diaspora on the policies and development strategies of the Republic of Armenia is a 
good illustration of this latter example.19 Nevertheless, economic explanations are not fully 
sufficient to understand all the reasons behind diaspora policies. In her comparative study, 
Laurie Brand20 identifies four non-economic sets of explanations: macro-historical, domestic 
political, security/stability explanations, and international politics. Each of these will be briefly 
reviewed below and integrated with similar findings from other scholarly works. 
  First, in macro-historical explanations the state’s interest in diasporas is shown to be 
related to particular stages of emigrant community development. When emigrants become 
economically and politically successful in host countries, if there is the possibility of their 
assimilation, sending states become more interested in maintaining ties with them. Second, 
domestic political system explanations focus on the characteristics of sending states as well as 
the actors involved in diaspora policies. Movement towards more open or participatory political 
systems after years of authoritarianism may urge sending states to approach emigrants as 
potential resources.21 Furthermore, certain elites in the home country might engage in 
mobilizing different sub-groups in the diaspora community to expand their interests and 
ideologies abroad. 22 Third, sending-states engage in activities to hinder opposition groups’ 
diasporic activities rather than creating opportunities for them in the host country context, due 
to her security concerns and ideologies of nationhood.23 Authoritarian states may use their 
extra-territorial bureaucracies to keep emigrants under surveillance and political control. 
Embassies/consulates have at times served to organize and host individuals or institutions 
whose primary functions are to monitor communities of nationals abroad. This took place in 
many Magrebi states during the 1960s and 70s.24 
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Lastly, the characteristics of international and regional politics matter, including 
sending states’ international position, power differentiations and bilateral relations between 
sending and receiving states, the role of international and regional organizations and the 
presence of specific international norms. Less powerful sending states prefer to develop less 
coherent diaspora policies, even leaving their nationals abroad in vulnerable positions, 
because these countries recognize that intervention will not be welcomed by the authorities of 
host states.25 When sending states improve their international positions and enhance their 
negotiation and lobbying power in the international arena, they are more likely to consolidate 
their engagement attempts. For instance, Brazil used its improved international position as an 
emerging power as a platform for intervention in its diaspora in Portugal. In 2007, during the 
Portuguese European Union (EU) Council presidency, the Brazilian diaspora in Portugal was 
mobilized to work for the realization of the EU Strategic Partnership with Brazil.26  Similarly, 
sending states’ foreign policy interests and discourses have an impact on engagement policies. 
As observed in the cases of Mexico-United States, Morocco-Spain, Argentina-Spain, sending 
states may use emigrants as a way of highlighting their importance in bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral relationships.27 For example, the Mexican government pursued lobbying activities 
that directly involved the Mexican American community in support of the North Atlantic Free 
Trade Area. Moreover, changes in policies can be the result of policy diffusion, transfer or 
adaptation, as observed in Latin American countries using the model of Mexico’s engagement 
policies in the US.28 Keeping the above-mentioned theoretical frameworks in mind, we will 
analyze the Turkish state-diaspora nexus in the following sections.  
From a Lack of Diaspora Policies to Selective, Unsuccessful Engagement Attempts 
Turkey’s policy framework concerning emigration has evolved through time. It has reflected 
different state policies under different govenrments as well as diverging host state approaches 
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to the Turkish migrant population abroad. Turkey’s diaspora policies can be examined in 
three periods: the 1960s-1970s, 1982-1990s, and 2000-present. In the early years of labor 
migration (1960-1970), the Turkish state labelled emigrants as Turkish Nationals Working 
Abroad or Workers Abroad, and it anticipated their return in the short run. In Francesco  
Ragazzi’s state typology, Turkey at this point fell into to the managed labor state category, 
which refers to states that have “a large emigrant population, but have not really developed 
policies toward them and have mostly focused on labor and circulation migration”.29 
Turkey had almost no concrete diaspora policy and no dedicated state institutions to 
conduct relations with emigrants except the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which 
has been sending imams and other religious representatives in the name of the Turkish state 
since 1971. The few other ad-hoc arrangements that did exist were mainly aimed at 
facilitating remittance flow. The main state office in charge was the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Its consulates were responsible for dealing with emigrants’ passports and their civil 
status. However, consulates often served citizens abroad poorly, as was reported and even 
discussed in the Turkish Parliament. Officers humiliated migrants, behaved badly and rarely 
helped them in solving their official problems.30 An emigrant living in Essen, Germany who 
represents a Turkish association there stated: “there were cases where people gave up Turkish 
citizenship just because they wanted to be rid of bad treatment in consulates and very long 
waiting hours.”31 In addition to consulates abroad, within Turkey there was a fragmented 
institutional structure in which seven ministries, three permanent under-secretaries and many 
other state offices were responsible for carrying out various emigrant-related services and 
none of them were particularly effective in meeting emigrants’ needs. 
In the second period, starting in 1982, the Turkish state attempted to build closer 
relations with emigrants in order to satisfy their needs and build institutions. Mügge, citing 
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Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004), accurately identifies Turkey as a “strategically selective 
state, which encourages certain forms of transnational participation while trying to selectively 
manage what migrants can and cannot do”.32 State policies in this period remained ineffective, 
while institutional services were limited and bad treatment of emigrants in Turkish state 
offices like consulates continued. An important formal step was taken with the introduction of 
a new article on emigrant affairs in the 1982 constitution. Article 62 stipulated the state can 
take the necessary measures to ensure family unity, the education of children, the cultural 
needs, and the social security of Turkish nationals working abroad, and can also take the 
necessary measures to reinforce their ties with the home country in addition to assisting them 
on their return home. Accordingly, the Diyanet intensified its activities through the 
establishment of the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs [DITIB] in 1984 in order to 
coordinate religious associations, in fact to prevent cultural assimilation among emigrants and 
maintain links within it.33 
Throughout the 1990s, Turkey showed some signs of institutional engagement with its 
diaspora but these either failed or remained limited in scope. They included establishing 
advisory boards and special parliamentary commissions.34 In their 1992 report, the special 
parliamentary commission indicated 110 key problems and proposed for the introduction of 
ten legislative changes, twelve bylaws and eighty-seven regulations.35 It showed that 
problems had accumulated and had become increasingly complex. However, due to the 
political and economic crisis unfolding at the same time, emigrant affairs were not prioritized 
and the report failed to trigger a public discussion.  
Turkey’s limited but growing interest in emigrants and its failures in instutionalization 
in this second period can be explained by three of the explanatory frameworks already 
introduced above: macro-historical, domestic politics and international politics. The Turkish 
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authorities’ security and stability concerns were aggravated at the end of the 1970s and early 
1980s due to political instability and the 1980 military coup. These triggered a wave of mass 
emigration, encompassing the different opposition groups including leftist-communists, 
Alevis and Kurdish nationalists who mainly arrived in Europe as exiles or asylum seekers. 
They experienced cultural revivalism and invested in developing identity politics abroad and 
sought active diasporic formation.36 It is no coincidence that the first attempts to form ethnic 
and religious organisations began at the same time. Some movements which were banned, 
oppressed or stigmatized in Turkey diffused their activities to Europe and found civil society 
organizations as well as underground groups that were operating under the title of migrant 
organizations. The Turkish state sought ways to reduce and control their political activities 
and intentionally failed to deliver services to them that had previously been enjoyed by 
‘mainstream’ apolitical migrant communities such as religiously conservative labor migrants. 
Security concerns urged the Turkish state to control politicized groups for intelligence 
purposes and to ‘design’ apolitical groups abroad in order to gain support. Nevertheless, the 
dramatic security and economic situation within Turkey throughout the 1990s substantially 
affected the state’s ability to control and influence its citizens abroad. The attention that the 
state could give to its citizens abroad also diminished.  It simply did not have the capacity or 
tools it needed to fully succeed in its goals. These were the first signs that Turkish domestic 
policies had diffused to the transnational space and that homeland security had become 
dominant in the state’s approach to its interactions with migrants abroad.  
Macro-historical factors also impacted on Turkey’s limited engagement methods. 
After 20 years of labor migration, Turkey started to become aware of the permanent 
settlement of its citizens in host countries, and of a need to develop diasporic policies to 
maintain ties and allegiances. As highlighted in the literature, the host country context 
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determines the sending state’s incentives and capacity to implement specific policies.37 
Germany was the main determining host state that influenced Turkey’s relations with 
emigrants due to its economic superiority and its importance within the EU. For example, 
when dual citizenship became an issue between Turkey and Germany, the latter determined 
the options of the former.38 Turkey accepted dual and multiple citizenships in 1981 (Law 
Number 403) with an amendment to the Turkish Citizenship Law of 1964, Article 2383. But 
Germany rejected dual citizenship in principle and required emigrants to renounce Turkish 
citizenship before they could become naturalized German citizens. As a compromise, Turkey 
introduced a new regulation in 1995 in which emigrants who gave up Turkish citizenship in 
order to get German citizenship were granted an identification card called a ‘pink card’.39 The 
card certified the holder’s national origin and allowed the former Turkish citizen the same 
residence, travel and work rights as Turkish citizens. Political rights and the right to work in 
the public sector, however, were excluded. Some interviewees in Cologne, Germany noted 
that these cards made emigrants feel that they were ‘step-citizens’ or ‘quasi’ citizens, or even 
‘illegal dual citizens’, but not real citizens either in Turkey or Germany.40 Thus, in contrast to 
its intention, Turkey’s policy made Turkish immigrants feel like they were in limbo. 
Factors related to domestic politics, macro-historical issues and international politics 
started to change in the 2000s, paving the way for Turkey to launch a concerted set of 
diaspora policies. Turkey’s experience of its interest in establishing an interactive relation 
with its diaspora will be on elaborated below.  
Intense Engagement and Institutionalization After 2003 
Turkey’s active engagement process started with the report prepared by a Parliamentary 
Investigation Commission in 2003.41 This addressed the problems of citizens abroad by 
examining all related state agencies’ services and suggested possible legislative and 
institutional changes. It also suggested the establishment of a seperate directorate responsible 
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for emigrant affairs. Instituional changes, as well as the formation of a directorate specifically 
concerned with diaspora affairs were introduced by, the Justice and Development Party 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, hereafter the AKP). These initiatives were quite similar to what 
Latha Varadarajan found about the Mexican example. In Mexico in the early 2000s, a distinct 
change from earlier rhetoric occurred and political parties finally began to acknowledge the 
importance of the diaspora. In line with this, homestates started implementing ‘transnationally 
informed policy-making”.42 Transnational links were surely present even before the AKP 
started formulating diaspora specific policies. More recently, however, a more overtly neo-
liberal state restructuring has been evident. This has included the transformation of dormant 
diasporas into influential ones.  
The conservative center-right AKP has held parliamentary majority and controlled 
most local governments since the 2002 parliamentary elections and the 2004 local elections. 
Adopting neo-liberal economic policies, the AKP-led government succeeded in bringing 
about profound economic transformation in Turkey, including a remarkable GDP growth rate 
and increase in per capita income.43 The AKP government also pursued political 
transformation, focusing particularly on democratization and the consolidation of stability 
with the influence of the EU which, officially recognized Turkey as a candidate country at the 
1999 Helsinki Summit. It launched various political reforms to guarantee fundamental rights, 
improve minority rights, and change the perceptions of formal national security. Although 
since 2011, it has curbed the processes of reform. These political transformations 
accompanied a new rhetoric of inclusiveness in domestic politics as well as a new 
geographical imagination and outreach in foreign policy.44 In the ideational realm of foreign 
policy, the government emphasized the importance of Ottoman heritage, Turkish values and 
Muslim unity. It sought novel ways of reaching out to all citizens abroad, including co-
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ethnics, kin communities and communities with historical ties to Turkey as a result of a 
common Ottoman history. Many defined this strategy as neo-Ottomanist  in nature and 
critically approached these newly developing engagement policies with the diaspora and kin 
communities.45 Reference to the Ottoman Empire and ‘Ottoman world’ became apparent 
various economic and cultural of diasporic activites.Seeing itself as responsible for the 
wellbeing of all these communities, the government opted to play the self-appointed role of 
the defender of Turkish Muslim communities; protecting migrants against the threat of 
Islamophobia and cultural assimilation.   
Given this background, and regarding its diaspora policies, Turkey moved from being 
a managed labor state to a global-nation state that  adopts many diaspora policies and provide 
emigrant populations with a greater number of rights. Various dimensions of the diaspora 
policies adopted by Turkey after 2003 can be systematically examined by using a revised 
version of Ragazzi’s diaspora policy taxonomy. This consists of religious/cultural policies; 
social/economic policies; citizenship policies; bureaucratic control policies; symbolic 
policies; and lastly, institutional policies.  
In terms of cultural policies, state established Turkish cultural centers and language 
courses abroad as well as organized summer schools in and trips to Turkey. Main priority was 
to develop strong ties with second and third generation emigrants abroad. Such initiatives 
aimed to promote Turkey and Turkish language, culture, art and history to foreigners and 
Turkish citizens abroad. In summer schools and during trips, the programs’ content covered 
leadership, Turkish language, culture and history, Turkey’s domestic and international politics 
and human rights. To this end, the Turkish state also granted emigrant children the right to 
free education at public universities, introduced scholarship programs, particularly in the 
medical sciences, education, Turkish language, Islamic Studies and Ottoman history.46 
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With regards to social and economic policies, Turkey is interested in the 
entrepreneurial activities of Turks abroad, their contribution to building trade relations, 
furthering economic growth, and strenghtening bilateral relations/export ties.47 In 2008, a 
semi-autonomous state agency, the Foreign Economic Relations Committee, established the 
World Turk Labor Council to collaborate economically with Turks abroad. The Council 
prepared a detailed paper in 2011 about which types of ‘diaspora strategies’ should be 
followed to increase the economic contribution of citizens abroad, and stated the goal of 
transforming the Turkish diaspora into one of the most influential diasporas on the world 
stage.48 Meanwhile, state agencies supported and consulted with Turkish migrant 
entrepreneurs via a range of associations. 
In terms of citizenship policies, Turkey expanded access to citizenship by granting 
more rights to former citizens. In 2004, a new ‘blue card’ certifying national origin replaced 
the pink card that was previously given to migrants who renounced Turkish citizenship and 
became naturalized host country citizens. In 2009, the rights guaranteed by the blue card were 
extended. Social security rights were added and the children of emigrants born outside Turkey 
were also given the same rights as Turkish citizens (except the right to vote and to be 
employed as a state officer). In 2014, blue card rights were added, relating to the pension 
system. However, emigrants interviewed in Cologne and Frankfurt reported that legal rights 
often fail to turn into actual practices.49 
Extending the franchise to migrants is another crucial issue and a way of strenghtening 
ties with citizens abroad. The Turkish parliament passed new legislation organizing the 
procedures for extraterritorial voting in May 2012.  For the presidential election in August 
2014, the June 2015 and the snap November 2015 Parliamentary Elections, citizens abroad 
were able to cast their votes at ballot boxes placed in 54 different countries where more than 
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500 citizens reside. In parliamentary elections, the turnout of diaspora voters reached to the 45 
per cent. Furthermore, there are ongoing discussions about whether some parliamentary seats 
should be reserved for diaspora representatives and political parties added some names from 
the diaspora to their candidates list.50 
Regarding symbolic policies, Turkey financed many activities to celebrate 50 years of 
emigration in 2011, including conferences, panels, photograph exhibitions and documentaries. 
However, it is observed that even for the 50th anniversary events, there were cleavages among 
various groups and state funding was not given to migrant organizations that were not pro-
government (Second author’s fieldwork observations, January-April 2015). For instance in 
Sweden, 50th anniversary events were organized separately-despite the fact that there was 
some level of cooperation- by the “50 year committee” and the other state-linked actors.  
In terms of institutional policies, consulates have been continueing as the main 
reference for emigrants.  Consulate services have improved since the AKP came into power 
and in general consulates have started to become more involved in Turkish communities.51 In 
Sweden too, interviewees from Turkish associations confirmed that there is more interaction 
between migrants’ associations and the embassies since the AKP came to power.52 
Furthermore, in a pilot survey of Turkish citizens residing in the United Kingdom conducted 
in August 2014, 230 out of 252 respondents said that they had seen service improvements.53 
Turkish officers working in the consulates have begun to treat emigrants better: they are more 
polite and cordial towards emigrants, and they no longer humiliate or look down on citizens. 
Two Turkish Consulate Generals serving in Cologne and Düsseldorf, Germany, stated that the 
Foreign Ministry has ordered consulates to develop close relations with emigrants, listen to 
them, facilitate bureaucratic procedures and connect with all types of emigrant-established 
associations.54 According to one migration expert and a vice president of an association in 
Germany, the substantive change is explicit because “instead of citizens going to the 
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consulates, right now consuls visit the citizens, visit associations, and participate in their 
activities”55 These developments stated above were aimed at benefiting all Turkish citizens 
despite their religious or ethnic background. However, when it came to designing diasporas as 
political tools within host countries, we see that the AKP government pursued a not so 
overarching strategy. 
In response to the long-standing need for an emigrant institution the Presidency of 
Turks Abroad and Kin Communities (PTAKC), a new state agency affliated with the Vice 
Presidency, was established in 2010 to function as a reference point for emigrant-related 
affairs. This is not something that is unique to Turkey. Today, increasingly, states such as 
Serbia, Canada, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ireland adopt these policies and even form 
ministries that are responsible for diasporas. A high-level PTAKC officer in Turkey told us 
that the institution utilizes ‘a broader diaspora definition,’ aiming to create broad diasporic 
membership.56 PTAKC is responsible for building social, cultural, and economic relations 
with three categories: (former) citizens abroad; kin and co-ethnic communities and foreign 
students. PTAKC was established with the motto of “wherever we have kin, we [the Turkish 
state] are there”. PTAKC reflects Turkey’s ethnic/religious conceptions of nationhood. 
Turkey’s conception of nationhood regards “the polity not as a territorial state and its 
inhabitants, but as a community that may be dispersed over several states”.57  
It is important to note that although the interviewees of both the first and the second 
author appreciated such an initiative, both in Germany and Sweden, some criticized the 
general stance and the particular activities of the PTAKC on many grounds. While discussion 
of these critiques is beyond the scope of this article, a general criticism raised about all these 
policies is that they embrace a selective approach and neglect cultural and political differences 
among emigrants. Groups like Alevis, Kurds and political opponents view these programs as 
part of a state effort to strengthen ties with religiously conservative Turks, or even only with 
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supporters of the current government. In Germany, representatives of Kurdish associations 
stated that they were isolated from events that they themselves had organized by the embassy 
and the by the consulates. Many interviewees suggested that the onset of new diaspora 
mobilization efforts were indeed a part of the Turkish state’s strategy to alienate Kurdish 
diaspora activism in Europe and counter-balance Kurdish claims that are delivered to political 
circles in Europe.58 So, although these initiatives can be perceived as positive developments 
regarding Turkey’s embrace of its wider population, a closer look at these policies actually 
reveal the ideologies of nationhood behind the process of diaspora creation. 
Why Has Turkey Designed New Diaspora Policies? 
Scholarship on recent changes in Turkey’s diaspora policies, with the exception of a few 
studies, have mainly provided general descriptive analysis that have failed to place the 
question of these policies within wider theoretical consideration.59 According to two recent 
studies, the state’s main motivations in creating concerted diaspora policies are: 1) to defend 
the rights of emigrants, and particularly to prevent them from experiencing discrimination, 
racism and Islamophobia within the EU; 2) to provide opportunities to strengthen emigrant 
capabilities; 3) to maintain emigrants’ ties with the homeland, and increase their contribution 
to politics, foreign policy and the economy; 4) to reflect the potential widening of Turkey’s 
conceptions of citizenship, belonging and identity.60 Also, drawing from transnationalism 
scholarship, Mügge (2012) argues that changes in Turkey’s policies over time can be 
explained by three factors: the shift from guestworkers to immigrants (the recognition of 
permanent stay), changing political climates in the home and the host state, and one-off 
political events that trigger ad-hoc government action.  
Mügge’s argument about the recognition of permanent stay is essential. Bekir Bozdağ, 
the former State Minister responsible for migrant affairs stated at the 50 year anniversary 
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celebrations that “we need to re-evaluate our policies, because those who emigrated did not go 
to return, they went to stay”.61 Nevertheless, there were other factors that also urged the state 
to translate this recognition into a wide range of diaspora policies.  These factors, which will 
be discussed further below, are associated with changes in domestic and international politics, 
specifically Turkey’s EU bid and its growing interest in adopting an assertive foreign policy 
stance.  
The starting point for the increasing interest in emigrants was consistent with the AKP 
government’s foreign policy priority of EU accession, which now seems to have been 
abandonned. The period between gaining candidate status (December 1999) and the opening 
of accession negotiations (December 2005) was critical for Turkey. The government greatly 
emphasized reforms designed to fulfil political membership criteria.  During this period, 
Turkey asked migrants in Europe to lobby in favour of EU membership, because they would 
influence Europe culturally and would serve as a catalyst in the accession process.62 This led 
to the emergence of a new label for emigrants: ‘Euro-Turks’.63 The government tried to 
encourage them to work as ‘ambassadors’ for the EU bid, as evinced in the speeches of the 
Turkish President Abdullah Gül (2007-2014), Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan (2002-2014) 
and Foreign Affairs Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (2009-2014), all of whom addressed the 
diaspora on various occasions. For instance, during his visit to the Netherlands in June 2004, 
former President Gül stated that because European countries are having hesitations regarding 
Turkish accession to the European Union, the Turkish diaspora in the Netherlands have the 
great task of reflecting the “contemporary, democratic and modern Turkey” in their country of 
residence.64 The diaspora in Germany was seen as particularly important for the EU bid. The 
consulate general in Düsseldorf agreed with this view, stating that “if Germans wanted 
Turkey’s membership, it would happen… The perspective of the German public about the 
21 
 
Turks here influences the German government and politics”.65 Often, emigrants themselves 
appropriated such a role. For instance, Turkish emigrants residing in Germany and France 
have expressed a wish to become more active in developing Turkish–EU relations.66 In the 
case of Turkey, as we will see below, the AKP’s foreign policy aims are not limited to EU 
accession. 
Turkey’s economic growth and democratic consolidation was seen as creating the 
conditions for an assertive foreign policy in the second half of the 2000s. The Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu envisioned Turkey being repositioned as a central, leading 
country, and dismissed the long-term characterization of Turkey as a bridge country between 
East and West. He promoted a policy of Turkish involvement in regional problem-solving in 
order to enhance its soft power and its regional stance vis à vis other actors. To this end, the 
government pursued a dynamic, multidimensional foreign policy and sought to demonstrate 
Turkey’s increasing capabilities.67 Strenghtening ties with emigrants and protecting them is 
one such area in which Turkey might display its muscle. Similar to the trend in Brazil’s 
relations with Portugal identified by Padilla (2011), Turkey tried to teach host countries like 
Germany a lesson via interventions and statements concerning discrimination against 
emigrants. From this perspective, emigrants are considered both a liability to the government 
in terms of requiring the state to take action, and an asset in terms of achieving its soft power 
goals. 
Diaspora Population as a Liability 
Through greater engagement with emigrants, it appears as though the government aimed to 
send a message to the international audience that “we are protecting our citizens” and 
“whoever has links with Turkey” both within and beyond its national borders. Such messages 
are also linked to domestic politics:  they reflect the features of the state’s new imagined 
22 
 
political community; expanding it by including previously excluded communities. Addressing 
migrant representatives on June 16, 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan stated that Turkey has 
become a powerful and ambitious country which now sets itself higher goals then before. As 
Turkey gains a greater say in world affairs, it now bears a greater responsibility protecting its 
citizens abroad including kin communities.68 Similarly the Foreign Minister, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, noted that Turkey is a strong country that not only deals with its domestic 
problems but also, with issues around the world. Being a world power requires taking care of 
its citizens abroad. He added: “This ancient nation will respond to the call of its kin, its 
relatives about every issue in every place... Turkey broke the chain that slowed it down, no-
one can stop Turkey”.69 As his speech shows, the idea behind these initiatives was also to 
boost Turkish citizens’ self-confidence abroad in order to make them feel a part of the state 
that is powerful and capable enough to care for them. On that note, a Turkish Consulate 
General in Cologne agreed with this point and noted that Turkey aims to present “a strong 
country image” and make its passport as valuable as the American passport.70  
Some Turkish citizens abroad admire the ‘strong home country’ discourse. As the vice 
president of an association, Milli Görüş, in Essen, Germany, said: “When Turkey was 
presented as a powerful country in the German media, this gave Turkish migrants self-
confidence, they identified themselves with this power, felt more allegiance. Migrants started 
to use similar discourses by saying things like “our home country is democratic, it is a 
developed country”.71 In Sweden, some interviewees from a youth organization said that 
Turkey had been depicted negatively in Swedish media and since that the AKP came to power 
they have seen a positive change in Turkey’s media depiction. The state’s interest in engaging 
with them has also contributed to their attachment to Turkey.72 
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The institutional policies developed in Turkey, crystallized with the establishment and 
growth of PTAKC, provides further evidence of the role of foreign policy considerations. 
Although a number of bureaucrats and associations had been lobbying for its establishment 
for a long time, the AKP government’s foreign policy considerations provided the opportunity 
for PTAKC to be established. A high-level PTAKC bureaucrat in Turkey discussed this as 
follows.  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) were not able to pursue policies of soft power, 
their interests might have contradicted each other, and their structures did not allow 
them to engage with emigrants enough, it was only one of the items on their list. Thus, 
there was a clear need for establishing a directorate whose responsibility would be 
solely focused on emigrants.73 
The interview accounts reveal that the PTAKC has been able to survive and grow 
institutionally for two reasons: first, the Foreign Minister’s support; and second, its budget. 
Foreign Policy Minister Davutoğlu emphasized themes like diaspora and citizen engagement. 
Thus diplomats were required to respect/not dispute the ‘importance’ of the PTAKC. Due to 
its ‘generous’ budget, the PTAKC is able to fund projects carried out by associations that are 
active in Western Europe and in countries where Turks live as a minority, such as Bulgaria, 
Greece, and Iraq.  
Diaspora as a Lobbying Asset 
AKP’s new diaspora policy surely overlapped with its new strategic outlook in other foreign 
policy realms that has been perceived as neo-Ottomanist, even neo-imperialist by many 
experts and scholars.74 As Bryant and Hatay75 put it “Turkey’s particular concern with those 
countries of the former Ottoman sphere with which it believes itself to have historical and 
cultural ties, as well as to its historical role as a leader of the Muslim world” strengthened 
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these arguments. Therefore, Turkey was following a neo-liberal trend of engaging with its 
diaspora and harnessing its potential like other countries such as Mexico and India, but at the 
same time it was pursuing a neo-Ottoman policy that was produced domestically as a foreign 
policy strategy.  
  Turkey’s diaspora policy was exclusionary towards Kurds, Alevites and Armenians 
besides other groups in opposition to the governing party, but it was inclusive towards kin 
communities which could be used as an asset for lobbying among other benefits in former 
Ottoman territories. The idea was to create “Turkish friendly” elites in these countries as part 
of the diaspora engagement policy, which would not only revive historical ties, alliances and 
cooperation, but also will create new venues of collaboration in the future, particularly trade 
relations. Similar to how the Turkish state approaches to its citizens abroad, the institutions 
responsible for diaspora engagement policies also approaced elites of kin communities abroad 
and enhanced their relationships in economic, political as well as social levels. PTAKC pays 
equal attention to both diaspora and kin groups yet uses different strategies. While engaging 
with the diaspora, PTAKC collaborates with think tanks, diaspora organizations as well as 
civil society organizations in order to infiltrate into grassroot organizations, it engages mostly 
at the elite level and university students with kin communities.  Diaspora is perceived as a 
potential pool of votes for the AKP besides other roles in lobbying and public diplomacy, 
while the kin communities are perceived as loyal allies abroad as well as investments for 
Turkey’s aim to be a global actor in the near future.  
With the new strategy, it can be observed that for the first time, the state acknowledges 
the diaspora’s agency in affecting transnational policy-making procedures and has included 
them not as passive actors but as catalysts of state strategies. The Turkish state perceived the 
diaspora as a potential lobby group in their respective countries of residence with the hope 
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that they might impact upon policies in line with the AKP’s new vision of Turkey. Turkish 
migrants’ networks and their lobbying affects were seen diplomatic tools and emigrants as 
political and cultural agents as well as new public diplomats.76 The government utilized the 
concept of public diplomacy and established the Public Diplomacy Coordinatorship as a state 
institution. For example, the head of the Public Diplomacy Coordinatorship, Ibrahim Kalın, 
referred to emigrants as a form of strategic and social capital using the term ‘functioning 
diaspora’ illustrates how the strong country discourse and lobbying imperatives overlap.77 
Meeting with Turkish migrants in Sweden, President Abdullah Gül’s speech reflected a 
similar overlap when he emphasized Turkey’s new role and made a call to citizens abroad: 
“You should act like ambassadors of your motherland, Turkey, which you should represent 
here in the best way. You should protect and defend Turkey’s image, as there could be anti-
Turkish propaganda”.78 This rhetoric clearly gives us the image that diaspora engagement was 
developing with only a small sector of the diaspora in mind; those who are in favor of the 
government’s policies and its definition of the “new Turkey.” 
Although Turkey is eager to benefit from emigrants and their civic organizations 
through lobbying, emigrants themselves may have different approaches. Some emigrants 
regard themselves as social capital for Turkey. For example, Huseyin Bayçöl, a Turkish 
columnist writing from Germany, stated “Turkey should go a step further in lobbying through 
its citizens living in Europe vis-a-vis the Armenian diaspora”.79 This sentiment also highlights 
what we have previously discussed in terms of counter-balancing the opposition and their 
lobbying activities. On the other hand, representatives of migrant associations and journalists 
in Germany have stated their discomfort with the new role of lobbyist given to them by 
Turkish politicians. The vice head of an association in Essen, Germany explained: 
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Lobbying can benefit Turkey, even just some groups in Turkey but not Turks in 
Germany…Turkish state involvement, any involvement coming from abroad (to 
Germany) is something that causes suspicion. Many of us continue to live here, we 
will not return to Turkey, we should not be turned into an instrument of Turkish 
foreign policy.80 
We observed the same reluctance among the Turkish diaspora elites in Sweden. 
Diaspora organizations want to build contingent alliances on certain issues, rather than taking 
direction from the Turkish Embassy or homeland actors. Emigrants are eager to lobby for 
Turkey or receive support from the Turkish state in lobbying only if interests overlap and, if 
the state does not impose its own ideology and agenda. Emigrants are concerned about two 
main issues. The first is the Turkish state’s perceived dominance. For example, Kaya (2011) 
notes how Turks abroad have started to complain about the paternalistic approach of the 
Turkish state. They no longer want to be perceived as passive, obedient and in urgent need of 
Turkish government support. The leaders of migrants’ associations in Sweden emphasized 
that they were seeking ‘partners not patrons’.81 Two interviewees of Turkish background in 
Germany agreed with this view, saying that they were happy that the Turkish state had not 
engaged with emigrants in the past because they were able to successfully run assocations, 
gain self-confidence, and communicate with groups like Kurds and Alevis (who were seen as 
opposition groups back in Turkey). Second, some emigrant groups believe that Turkey’s 
attempt to create a Turkish lobby could generate ‘competition among groups with various 
political and ideological standpoints within the respective Turkish communities for the claim 
of being their sole representative’.82 It is questionable whether the AKP’s interventions in 
diaspora policies, especially in Germany were actually useful. While the AKP acted to 
increase the scope of AKP-favoring diaspora groups’ actions and constantly intervened in 
Turkish diaspora-German relations, it also inadvertantly created a negative image in 
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Germany. This is evinced by German media coverage of former prime minister and current 
president Tayyip Erdoğan and his policies. This situation raised concerns for host society 
authorities about Turkey’s close involvement with Turkish immigrants, especially with 
regards to seeing this involvement as a factor impeding immigrant integration. Some 
interviewees from Turkish umbrella organizations stated that Erdoğan’s harsh criticism of 
Germany’s integration policies and his gathering of masses in rallies irritates many Germans 
and does more damage than good.83 One should also consider whether this selective diaspora 
formation strategy has entrenched already existing divisions between ethnic groups from 
Turkey. As it stands, currently implemented policies are not state-policies but are AKP 
policies, which are very much shaped by the AKP’s vision of nationhood, values and foreign 
policy aims. For instance, the AKP has re-activated and dominated some organizations like 
Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) rather than cooperating with previously 
established organizations in order to create new networks with members who are supporters 
of the AKP. Lobby networks formed around UETD and organizations like it also set the basis 
for the AKP’s transnational electon campaigns abroad.84 The basis of the AKP’s diaspora 
policy does not follow the democratic citizenship agenda but rather focuses on Sunni Muslim 
Turkish identity which is in line with its ideological stance. Therefore Kurdish, Alevite or 
Assyrian are not included in state-diaspora nexus, despite the fact that bureaucrats constantly 
make declarations that they try to reach to wider audiences. 
Conclusion 
The Turkish case is not exceptional with respect to the significance of international 
politics in designing diaspora policies. There are commonalities with the Mexican case 
particularly in light of the link between bidding to join a strong regional organization and a 
simultaneous growing interest in emigrant lobbying. It also demonstrates some similarities 
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with the Brazilian case in terms of an improvement in its international position. It can be 
hypothesized that emerging powers like Brazil, the Russian Federation, India, China and 
South Africa, which are also well-known sending states, may become more sensitive to 
meeting the demands of and strengthening ties with their diaspora populations as they gain 
greater engagement capabilities and potentially seek to utilize diaspora populations to 
improve their international standing.   
As a sending state, similar to the other examples mentioned above, Turkey has 
replaced the general state negligence of the 1970s, and the shattered, ineffective policies of 
the 1980s and 1990s, with policies of active engagament since 2003 when the AKP came to 
power. Having acknowledged Turkey’s interest in diaspora formation is in line with a global 
trend, we have argued that we also need to take domestic and foreign policy contexts into 
account in order to fully understand Turkey’s aims of strengthening and designing 
engagement with Turkish citizens abroad. We identified a number of reasons why the AKP 
government prioritized transnationalizing their vision of a new Turkey. In particular, two 
factors, related to international politics, have had a great deal of impact on this: Turkey’s EU 
bid until around 2007, and its assertive foreign policy. The reflection of Turkey’s domestic 
politics has also played a role in how the state and its institutions formulated a diaspora 
engagement policy. In the broader context of foreign policy, the diaspora population is 
approached as both a liability by the government – in that it must protect emigrants in host 
countries and address their demands – and a lobbying asset that might enhance Turkey’s 
image as a leading country and increasing its soft power. We observe that new policies 
surrounding the diaspora engagement ideal actually reflects the governement’s perception of a 
new Turkey and transnationalizes this vision in order to increase its reach as much as 
possible. This idea of new Turkey as a global actor had a lot to do with Turkey’s Ottoman 
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legacy and many rightly interpreted this strategy as neo-Ottoman. Therefore, we found that 
while Turkey was producing policies in line with the neo-liberal trend of tapping the diaspora 
resources, it was also reflecting its new vision of foreign policy to its engagement with the 
diaspora and kin communities. We suggest that Turkey’s diaspora policy cannot be 
understood without looking at its foreign policy and its neo-Ottoman undertones.  
Finally, the case of Turkey provides some insights into debates around citizenship and 
diaspora building. Although it is evident that Turkey has attempted to expand external 
citizenship, it is still open to question whether it might be able to develop transnational 
conceptions of citizenship and belonging. It has been shown that existing diaspora policy 
targets groups that are favorable to the AKP government and it ignores the other groups from 
Turkey that are considered to be ‘the opposition’ in the broadest sense. Furthermore, the 
implications of diaspora building also lies in the extent to which this a process run by the 
state, by migrants themselves, or by both. Specifically, the reshaping of diaspora politics 
according to government party policy raises questions about neutrality towards different 
groups. Party policy priorities may create tensions amongst various diaspora groups, 
strengthen the positions of certain groups with regard to others, and generate host country 
resentments. Although it is still too early to arrive at generalizations regarding these new 
implementations, one can easily observe that the domestic tensions reflected in diaspora 
spaces and in Turkish foreign policy aspirations have becomed intertwined. Based on this, we 
believe that further research looking at the implications of these policies for diaspora 
populations and their relations with host states would make an important contribution to the 
growing literature, not only on diaspora policies but also on discussions centering on 
citizenship.  
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